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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 805 
INSURANCE-RATE REGULATION-CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF GUAR-
ANTY BoND AGREEMENT-Plaintiff, an insurance agents' association and 
several other insurance companies and associations, instituted an ac-
tion attacking an order of the State Board of Insurance. The order 
approved a guaranty bond form, together with rates and rules, which 
had been submitted to ,the Board pursuant to statute1 by the defendant 
insurance company.2 The guaranty agreement was an arrangement whereby 
defendant guaranteed payment of losses under fire -insurance policies 
of other insurers in the event the latter should be unable to pay. Although 
the bond form was not restricted to any specific original insurers, it 
was contemplated that defendant would use ,the guaranty arrangement in 
connection with the policies of its affiliate. Defendant was subject to 
regulated fire insurance rates, while its affiliate was not, even though both 
were under common management; thus, its affiliate was able to sell fire 
insurance at lower rates than those fixed by ,the Board for defendant.3 
1 TEX. INS. CODE ANN., art. 5.13-.24 (1952). 
2 The relevant portion of the bond form is set out in the principal case at 299. 
a TEX. INS. CODE ANN., art. 5.26 (1952). 
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Plaintiff objected to the guaranty agreement on the ground that it would, 
in effect, permit defendant to write fire insurance at unregufated rates. 
The lower court agreed and set aside ·the Board's order. On appeal, held, 
reversed, one judge dissenting. The guaranty agreement was a true gu~ranty 
bond, not a fire insurance policy, and thus was not subject to regulated 
raites. International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Dallas Ass'n of Ins. Agents, 351 
S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). 
In a great many courts, at some time or another, there has been 
confusion in varying degrees over the use of the words "guaranty," 
"surety" and "reinsurance" when found in a common factual context. 
Often, a too-liberal interchange of these words and failure to make a 
careful distinction between them have caused the confusion. The Texas 
courts, however, seem to have recognized the fundamental •technical 
distinctions. In a true guaranty situation, a guarantor promises to 
perform, or pay for the nonperformance of, an act which a third party 
is contractually bound to perform for the promisee; thus the guarantor's 
promise is contingent upon failure of performance by the third party:1 
A contract of suretyship is much the same as a guaranty, except that the 
surety is joinlJly liable on ·the third party's contract, while the guarantor 
is not.5 Reinsurance, on the other hand, while it may resemble suretyship 
and guaranty in practical operation, is often wholly different in legal 
effect. In a contract of reinsurance, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify 
an original insurer for losses arising under ,the original insurer's policies.6 
T,he event which conditions •the reinsurer's duty to pay is therefore the 
same contingency which gives rise to the reinsured's liability to the 
original insured. The rights of ·the original insured, however, depend upon 
the terms of the contract. If it.he contract is solely between the reinsurer 
and ithe original insurer, the origiinal insured has no claim upon the 
reinsurer.7 On tlle other hand, the contract of reinsurance may contain 
4 Wood v. Canfield Paper Co., 117 Tex. 399, 5 S.W.2d 748 (1928); National City 
Bank v. Taylor, 293 s.w. 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See generally SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP 
§ 6 (1950). 
5 Arnett v. Simpson, 235 S.W. 982 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Farmers 8: Merchants Nat. 
Bank v. Lillard Milling Co., 210 S.W. 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). See generally SIMPSON, 
SURETYSHIP §§ 5, 14 (1950). 
6 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Associated Employers Lloyds, 250 S.W ,2d 477 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1952). Accord, Allemannia Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 209 U.S. 326 (1908); 
Friend Bros., Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 316 Mass. 639, 56 N.E.2d 6 (1944). See generally 
13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 7681 (1943). 
7 See Morrow v. Burlington Basket Co., 66 S.W .2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); 
Southwestern Sur. Ins. Co. v. Stein Double Cushion Tire Co., 180 S.W. 1165 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1915). Accord, Taggart v. Keim, 103 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1939) (agreement held not a 
guaranty because there was no privity between· reinsurer and reinsured); Greenman v. 
- General Reinsurance Corp., 237 App. Div. 648, 262 N.Y. Supp. 569, aff'd without opinion, 
262 N.Y. 701, 188 N.E. 128 (1933). See generally 13 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 7694 (1943); 
VANCE, INSURANCE § 207, at 1071 (3d ed. 1951). 
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a specific provision binding the reinsurer to pay claims to policyholders 
of the original insurer, thus giving to the original insured a right to 
prosecute his claim against both.8 A third type of contract may provide 
for a release of the original insurer subject to agreement by the original 
insured tha!t he will accept the obligation of the reinsurer in return for 
his discharge of the original insurer.9 
It is clear that the court properly analyzed the agreement in the 
principal case, in technical legal terms, and found it to be a guaranty ar-
rangement. The defendant, as guarantor under the proposed agreement, 
was to become liable to the policyholders of its affiliate in the event that 
that company should become unable to pay. This was not a contract of re-
insurance, because the contract was between defendant and the original 
insured, rather than between defendant and its affiliate.1° Although it is 
true that certain reinsurance contracts may provide for rights and duties 
as between the reinsurer and the original insured,11 the fact that reinsurance 
contemplates indemnification of the original insurer against losses under its 
policies would seem to deny the existence of such a contract where the 
original insurer is not a party. Nor was it a suretyship arrangement, since 
defendant was not jointly liable on its affiliate's insurance policies, but 
was liable only in the event that a final judgment rendered against its 
affiliate was not paid within thirty days. But here the analysis stops, with 
the court saying, in effect, that a finding that the agreement is a guaranty 
bond necessarily precludes any finding that -the agreement might also be 
for fire insurance within the meaning of the statute providing for the 
regulation of fire insurance rates. Such a conclusion is not obligatory, 
however, especially in light of a general ,trend toward regarding many 
surety and guaranty agreements as contracts of insurance.12 Mortgage 
guaranties and fidelity bonds are but two of the various types of agree-
ments which have been held to constitute guaranty insurance.13 And 
although guaranty insurance is not fire insurance in form, in this instance 
it is nevertheless fire insurance in practical effect.14 
The leading Texas case to consider the relationship between a guaranty, 
or suretyship, and an insurance contract, held that a fidelity bond, although 
s See VANCE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1071-73. 
9 Id. at 1073-74. 
10 See authorities cited notes 6, 7 supra and accompanying text. 
11 See Vance, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1071-73, and text accompanying note 8 supra. 
12 See 9 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 5273 (1943); 1 COUCH, INSURANCE 644-49 (2d ed. 1959). 
1s E.g., Bowers v. Lawyers Mortgage Co., 285 U.S. 182 (1932); United States v. Home 
Title Ins. Co., 285 U.S. 191 (1932); Young v. American Bonding Co., 228 Pa. 373, 77 
Atl. 623 (1910); Town of Troy v. American Fid. Co., 120 Vt. 410, 143 A.2d 469 (1958). 
For an extensive list of cases, see Annots., 119 A.L.R. 1241 (1939); 100 A.L.R. 1449 
(1936); 63 A.L.R. 711 (1929). 
14 Sec VANCE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 197. 
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technically a surety arrangement, was in legal effect insurance.11• A 
number of similar decisions have followed,16 apparently guided by the 
principle that little, if any, weight should be given to ·the words used to 
characterize or classify the contract, and that ,the purpooe and effect of 
the agreement should determine its legal consequences.17 In the principal 
case, although ·the agreement was termed a "gu.u-anty bond," the actual 
effect was to indemnify the original insured for any loss of money 
sustained due to default by the original insurer. The real question for 
the court, therefore, was whether such a promise to indemnify, when con-
sidered from the standpoint of its purpose and effect, was truly conditioned 
upon failure to perform by 1.he original insurer, or whether it was actually 
contingent only upon a fire loss suffered by insured, so as to make the 
agreement subject to ·the regulated fire rates.18 
There were several factors existing in this situation which might 
tend to show that the guaranty bond was in purpose and effect a form 
of fire insurance. First, and probably most significant, was the condition 
precedent ,to defendant's duty to pay. Although liability would attach 
if the original insurer, defendant's affiliate, was judicially declared to be 
insolvent or was placed in receivership, these conditions seem unimportant 
in light of the clause which provided that liability would attach if the 
original insurer should otherwise be found "unable to pay." Under the 
agreement, the original insurer would be deemed unable to pay if a 
final judgment rendered against it was not sa·tisfied within thirty days.19 
It is plain that the original insurer could purposely defer payment for 
thkty days, even though perfectly able to pay, and thus bring into 
existence defendant's duty to pay.20 The potential of such a scheme is 
obvious; it could, in practical effect, operate exactly as a fire insurance 
contract, at the whim and discretion of the parties. A second factor is 
15 Southern Sur. Co. v. Austin, 17 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929). 
HI E.g., Ware v. Heath, 237 S.'W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Maryland Cas. Co. v. 
Crescent Valley Creamery, 103 S.W .2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); National Auto Serv. 
Corp. v. State, 55 S.W .2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). 
17 "In determining whether a contract is one of suretyship or insurance, courts will 
consider the substance, rather than the form, of the contract. The fundamental nature 
of the contract cannot be changed by the names by which the parties may designate 
themselves." Southern Sur. Co. v. Austin, 17 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929). 
18 As was stated in the dissenting opinion, principal case at 306, it seems clear that 
the legislature intended to distjnguish between fire insurance and guaranty bonds. The 
portion of the Insurance Code which regulates guaranty bonds expressly excludes from 
its scope the writing of fire insurance. TEX. INs. CODE ANN., art. 5.13 (1952). This ex-
clusion would also seem to evidence an intent to subject all fire insurance policies to 
the scrutiny of the rate regulation provisions, even though they are in the form of 
guaranty bonds. 
19 See principal case at 299. 
20 Indeed, as the dissenting judge stated: "No execution that I know of could be 
satisfied within thirty days after final judgment. The liability of [defendant] would 
attach before the ordinary execution could be satisfied." Principal case at 305. 
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cliat such a guaranty arrangement may act as a powerful inducement, to 
insure with the unregulated companies whose performance the agreement 
was intended to guarantee. In the principal case, defendant's affiliate was 
an unregulated insurer of relatively small financial size. Thus, the fact 
that defendant's stronger financial position effectively guaranteed the 
obligations of the affiliate company might well encourage individuals to 
seek fire protection with the smaller, unregulated company. In addition 
to the lower rates offered by the unregulated affiliate, there would be the 
added inducement of financial stability and security which the guaranty 
of the larger company would provide.21 A third consideration is the 
state attitude toward certain so-called contracts of reinsurance. Several 
years prior to the principal decision, defendant and other insurance 
companies had been reinsuring the policies of unregulated companies. 
Included in these contracts, however, was a provision giving the original 
insured a direct right of action againt the reinsurer. In response to a 
request by ·the State Board of Insurance for an opinion as to the legality 
of these agreements, the Attorney General of the State of Texas ruled 
that such contracts were illegal where the original insurer was issuing 
policies at rates lower than those to which the reinsurer was subject.22 
It seems clear that the purpose behind the guaranty bond in -the principal 
case was to attempt to achieve the same result by means of little more 
than a change in nomenclature. It is difficult to comprehend how, when 
a contract entitled "reinsurance" is thought •to be illegal, it may never-
theless be validated by a slight alteration of the merely formal effects of 
the contract and by changing the name ,to "guaranty bond." And this 
21 Without the guaranty, the prospect of insuring with defendant's affiliate, Fort 
Worth Lloyds, would undoubtedly have been less attractive. In regard to certain highly 
desirable Federal Housing Authority contracts for which Fort Worth Lloyds was compet-
ing, the court said that an "order to meet claimed inadequacies in financial structure 
of certain deviators or unregulated companies caused Fort \Vorth Lloyds, an unregulated 
company as to fire rates, to secure financial backing of its affiliate, International Service 
[defendant], in providing ..• that its commitment on housing projects would be met.'' 
Principal case at 302. It is perhaps significant to note that at the end of 1957, approx-
imately two years before the disputed application was filed, International Service had 
assets of $8,896,000 and surplus available to policyholders of $2,092,000 while Fort Worth 
Lloyds had assets of $625,000 and surplus of $452,000. ALFRED M. BEST Co., BEST's INSUR-
ANCE GUIDE 119, 322 (1958). At the end of 1960, the assets of International Service were 
reported at $13,019,100 with surplus of $3,438,326. NATIONAL UNDERWRITER Co., ARGUS 
CASUALTY &: SURETY CHART 36 (1961). In contrast, Fort Worth Lloyds wrote no insurance 
during 1960 and had assets of $655,080 and surplus of $637,581. NATIONAL UNDERWRITER 
Co., ARGUS FIRE CHART 91 (1961). These data would seem to support the conclusion 
that the financial structure of Fort \Vorth Lloyds was not suitable for an underwriting 
project of any magnitude, and that the relative afiluence of International Service would 
provide a great inducement to insure with its weaker affiliate. On Lloyd's underwriters 
in general, see 2 CoucH, INSURANCE §§ 18:8-:10 (2d ed. 1959). Financial failures and 
increasing statutory restrictions have caused a virtual extinction of the Lloyd's associa-
tion activities in the United States. 
22 Principal case at 303. 
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difficulty is increased by the fact that the reinsurance contracts which were 
struck down by the Attorney General gave the original insured a direct 
right of action against the reinsurer.23 Although perhaps technically 
reinsurance, they were little more than contracts of suretyship-arrange-
ments so like those in the principal case as to admit of no significant 
practical distinction. Thus, although the soundness of the legal analysis 
which produced •the finding that the arrangement was a guaranty is not 
to be questioned, the court failed to consider further the agreement in 
light of its purpose and effect. Pevhaps the court felt it should defer to 
the findings of the State Board of Insurance which resulted in approval 
of the guaranty bond form,24 and did not feel disposed to probe more 
deeply into the practical workings of the agreement in order to expose 
an incipient avoidance of insurance rate regulation. But if affiliated 
insurance organizations take full advantage of the opportunity afforded 
them by this decision, corrective legislation may become necessary. 
Robert L. Harmon 
23 See authorities cited notes 7 and 8 supra and accompanying text. 
24 See principal case at 302: "We do not believe that the Board was arbitrary and 
capricious in approving the filing • . . ." 
